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Problems and Recommendations 
Lost in Stagnation 
The EU’s Next Multiannual Financial Framework 
(2014–2020) and the Power of the Status Quo 
The European Union’s Multiannual Financial Frame-
work (MFF) defines its strategic goals for 2014 to 
2020 and lays out how their implementation is to be 
financed through the EU budget. It states upper limits 
for the EU’s total annual spending and for the indi-
vidual budget headings. The European Commission 
published drafts for the MFF and the implementing 
regulation on 29 June 2011 and amended versions on 
6 July 2012. The critical phase of this exceptionally 
tricky round of negotiations has begun. The Commis-
sion is proposing a Financial Framework to run for 
seven years, with the amended version comprising a 
total volume of about one trillion euros (€1,033 bil-
lion at constant 2011 prices). This enormous sum of 
commitment appropriations represents 1.08 percent 
of the gross national product (GNP) of the EU-27. 
At the end of the negotiating process there must be 
a compromise accepted by all the member-states and 
the three EU organs: European Commission, European 
Council and European Parliament. The four previous 
budget rounds have always reached such a consensus 
in the end, and there is no doubt that will be the case 
this time too. However, the Multiannual Financial 
Framework, the spending priorities and the EU’s own 
resources mechanism – in short, the EU’s existing 
funding and budget system – have been under criti-
cism for decades. Broadly speaking, the following com-
plaints come up again and again: 
 The Financial Framework’s current volume of about 
1 percent of EU GNP is too small to achieve a real 
steering effect. 
 On the spending side limited resources are con-
centrated too heavily in just two fields, agriculture 
and cohesion policy, leaving insufficient funding 
available for financing European public goods. 
 European funding is unfairly distributed, with 
even relatively prosperous member-states receiving 
grants and subsidies under the two largest budget 
headings. 
 The budget funding mechanism is overly compli-
cated and lacks transparency. The revenue side is 
governed by numerous corrections and rebates, 
the best-known example being the British budget 
rebate. 
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 The own resources mechanism grants the EU only 
very limited budgetary autonomy, for it cannot 
make its own decisions about the volume or sources 
of its revenues. The member-states fund the EU 
budget almost completely through their national 
budgets, and therefore have the last word on vol-
ume and modalities of funding. 
In other words, the EU budget is far from meeting 
the standards, expectations or criteria that apply to 
national public budgets. The EU budget, critics say, 
is primarily used to fund redistributive policies with 
marginal growth effects, and the prohibition on bor-
rowing robs the Union of the flexibility to respond to 
short-term challenges, because spending and revenues 
must always balance. Moreover, the EU cannot make 
its own autonomous decisions about how to fund its 
budget. 
These criticisms are largely – if not in all points – 
shared by decision-makers in the EU organs and 
member-states. Certainly, the European Commission, 
the European Parliament and the European Council 
of heads of state and government have repeatedly 
acknowledged the necessity to overhaul the EU bud-
get, and underlined the need for action. But if that is 
the case why have no fundamental reforms to address 
the problems yet been considered or implemented? 
This paradox stems above all from the extreme 
path-dependency of the European budget system. 
Every compromise reached consolidates institutional 
structures and increases the costs of change, even as 
the outcomes of the negotiations become ever less con-
vincing and indeed unsatisfactory for those involved. 
If the criticisms of the existing system are shared 
even by the central players, it is high time to search 
for new ways to stimulate reform activities and shake 
off inertia. But in view of the political realities there 
seems little point in disseminating yet more norma-
tive proposals for an ideal European Financial Frame-
work, priorities and public goods the EU should pay 
for, and how it should fund its budget fairly and 
adequately. There are already plenty of studies of that 
ilk, none of which have done anything to overcome 
fundamental disinterest, inertia and fixation on the 
status quo. Nor is the current round of negotiations 
moving towards an optimised EU budget adequate to 
the theoretical requirements of financial federalism. 
Instead the strong current of political realism forces 
negotiators to find a result acceptable to member-state 
governments and parliaments within the prescribed 
timeframe. 
In this negotiating environment a gradual recon-
figuration is the best that can be expected, in the 
sense of a pragmatic shifting of spending priorities. 
To this end, the talks on the new legal basis for the 
central spending policies of cohesion and agriculture 
must be closely tied to the talks on the Financial 
Framework itself. 
The current economic and debt crisis might provide 
a lever to crack open ossified structures and initiate a 
long-term reform process. But the net payers, in par-
ticular, are pursuing a strategy of strictly separating 
the euro crisis and the MFF talks. A linkage strategy 
could involve channelling support from the European 
Structural Funds only to states that make credible 
efforts to overcome the structural competitive dis-
advantages that are the actual underlying cause of 
the crisis. The EU objectives and funding eligibility 
of cohesion policy would need to be brought in line 
with the new competitiveness indicators. European 
funding policy could thus slowly and incrementally 
be realigned to new fields and goals. Such an outcome 
can open the door to an effective long-term reform of 
the EU’s budget and finance systems. The end of this 
process could be a truly federal budget as a central 
pillar of a European Political Union. 
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The EU Budget Negotiation System 
 
On 29 June 2011, the European Commission published 
its drafts and proposals for the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework.1 By the end of 2011, fifty-seven 
proposals relating to the legal basis for European 
spending programmes had been submitted, in almost 
all policy areas.2 The most important are the legis-
lative proposals of October 2011 for the two largest 
spending blocks in the EU budget, European cohesion 
policy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).3 
Since then, the Commission’s comprehensive package 
has been negotiated in the Council of Ministers, ini-
tially under the Polish Presidency in the second half 
of 2011, then under the Danish Presidency in the first 
half of 2012, and now under the Cypriot Presidency. 
At the end of its term, the Danish Presidency pub-
lished a “negotiation box” summarising the stage the 
talks had reached.4
 
1  European Commission, A Budget For Europe 2020, COM(2011) 
500 final (Brussels, 29 June 2011); European Commission, 
Draft Interinstitutional Agreement Between the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission on Cooperation in Budgetary Matters 
and on Sound Financial Management, COM(2011) 403 final (Brus-
sels, 29 June 2011); European Commission, Proposal for a Coun-
cil Regulation Laying Down the Multiannual Financial Framework 
for the Years 2014–2020, COM(2011) 398 final (Brussels, 29 June 
2011). 
 Cyprus’s negotiation box now 
provides the first idea of the structure of an overall 
2  The proposals are collected in Annex 1 to Communication 
from the Commission, A Simplification Agenda for the MFF  
2014–2020, COM(2012) 42 final (Brussels, 8 February 2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/fin_ 
fwk1420/com_2012_42.5_annex1_en.pdf. 
3  On 6 July 2012 the European Commission published an 
amended proposal for the MFF 2014–2020, to take account of 
two new challenges: a) the effect of Croatia’s accession to the 
EU on the budget and b) the influence of the latest economic 
data and the distribution of the European Structural Funds 
among member-states. In the amended version the total 
volume increased by €8 billion to €1,033 billion in commit-
ment appropriations (1.08 percent of EU GNP). In the pay-
ment appropriations the amended proposal totals €988 
billion (1,03 percent of EU GNP). European Commission, 
Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation Laying Down the Multi-
annual Financial Framework for the Years 2014–2020, COM(2012) 
388 final (Brussels, 6 July 2012). 
4  Council of the European Union, Multiannual Financial 
Framework (2014–2020) – Negotiating Box, 11539/12 (Brussels, 
19 June 2012). 
compromise, although without yet stating concrete 
budget forecasts or figures.5 The heads of state and 
government discussed the MFF for the first time on 
28/29 June 2012, agreeing only to seek agreement by 
the end of 2012.6 An extraordinary European Council 
on 22/23 November 2012 will be an important stage 
in this process. Last but not least, the European Par-
liament defined its negotiating position in June 2011,7 
and passed a resolution calling for proper account to 
be taken of its demands with a large majority on 11 
June.8
The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014 to 
2020 will be the fifth since 1988. Altogether the MFF 
has been a very successful instrument, having guar-
anteed the EU’s budgetary stability for more than two 
decades. The Treaty of Lisbon incorporates this central 
component of European budget policy into European 
treaty law (article 312, Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). 
The new treaty contains certain important modifica-
tions to previously informal instruments and pro-
cedures, which are now being applied for the first 
time. Thus in future the Multiannual Financial Frame-
work will be adopted in the legally binding form of 
a EU regulation, meaning that the fundamental bud-
getary decisions it contains require the unanimous 
agreement of all member-states and the consent of all 
three EU organs.
 
9
 
5  Council of the European Union, Multiannual Financial Frame-
work (2014–2020) – Negotiating Box, 13620/12, Brussels (18 Sep-
tember 2012). 
 The European Parliament has been 
formally integrated into the legislative process. It 
must be kept properly informed of the progress of 
negotiations and at the end of the process approve 
6  European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 76/12 (Brussels, 29 
June 2012), item 6. 
7  European Parliament, Investing in the Future: A New Multian-
nual Financial Framework (MFF) for a Competitive, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Europe, P7_TA-PROV(2011)0266 (Strasbourg, 8 June 
2011). 
8  European Parliament, Multiannual Financial Framework and 
Own Resources, P7_TA-PROV(2012)0245 (Strasbourg, 13 June 
2012). 
9  Unanimous agreement is required at least until the Euro-
pean Council unanimously decides to adopt the next finan-
cial framework by qualified majority. 
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by majority vote the draft regulation negotiated by the 
member-states. Here, a new and confident actor with 
its own budgetary interests and objectives has entered 
the negotiating arena. 
The Treaty of Lisbon also places limits on exces-
sively rigid negotiating positions. Article 312 (4) stip-
ulates: “Where no Council regulation determining a 
new financial framework has been adopted by the end 
of the previous financial framework, the ceilings and 
other provisions corresponding to the last year of that 
framework shall be extended until such time as that 
act is adopted.” According to the European Commis-
sion’s proposal the 2013 budget amounts to about 
€138 billion in payment appropriations. The Council 
adopted its position on the Commission’s draft budget 
on 24 July 2012 and set the upper limit of payments 
at €132.7 billion. The European Parliament, however, 
asked for an increase to €137.9 billion in payment 
appropriations. Conciliation between Council and 
Parliament on the 2013 annual budget will start in 
November 2012 and will be of great political impor-
tance as these figures will set the lower limit for the 
MFF as specified in primary law. 
The outcome of this twenty-five-year development 
process is a well-oiled negotiating process in which 
most conflicts are predictable and roles are largely 
known and accepted. This ensures (at least for the 
moment) that the budget talks can end in an un-
challenged consensus that guarantees seven years of 
budgetary stability and security of planning.10 The 
participants prefer to agree on the lowest common 
denominator in a familiar procedure rather than 
becoming entangled in the conflicts that an (over-) 
ambitious initiative to modernise and reform would 
involve – especially given that it would contain the 
risk of the negotiations failing. The European budget 
and finance system no longer offers opportunity for 
the institutional power struggles that raged between 
the EU’s organs in the 1970s and 1980s. The conven-
ient if also unsatisfying stability and predictability of 
compromise weighs heavier than the insecurity and 
incalculability of fundamental reconfiguration.11
 
10  Johannes Lindner, Conflict and Change in EU Budgetary Politics 
(London, 2006); idem., “Institutional Stability and Change: 
Two Sides of the Same Coin”, Journal of European Public Policy 
10, no. 6 (2003): 921–35. 
 
11  Joachim Schild, “How to Shift the EU’s Spending Priori-
ties? The Multi-annual Financial Framework 2007–13 in 
Perspective”, Journal of European Public Policy 14, no. 4 (2009): 
531–49. 
Status quo as probable outcome 
Despite heated conflicts along often familiar lines, 
despite classical distribution problems, and despite 
the difficult circumstances, the European Union has 
always succeeded in agreeing a compromise for the 
next Multiannual Financial Framework. And it will 
again this time. All the parties have an interest in 
achieving the minimum objective of the budget nego-
tiations and concluding them with a compromise. 
They wish to demonstrate the EU’s viability with a 
Financial Framework that guarantees plannability 
and predictability and provides adequate funding for 
its central tasks. 
The procedures are well-practised, and the predict-
ably tricky negotiations will, if experience is anything 
to go by, receive intense media attention. For that 
reason, too, agreement on an overall package will be 
reached in the end. A scenario for a conceivable out-
come can already be sketched out: 
 The total volume of the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework will lie roughly in the middle between 
the European Commission’s proposal and the posi-
tion of the net payers: in other words, around 
€1,050 billion. 
 The structure of the next Financial Framework will, 
as suggested by the European Commission, very 
closely follow the precepts of the European growth 
and employment strategy “Europe 2020”. 
 The member-states are keeping an especially close 
eye on the tangible short-term consequences of 
the budget compromise and its repercussions on 
their national net balance, at the expense of the 
Commission’s proposals for long-term structural 
change. A one-sided concentration on the budget 
headings monopolises attention and increasingly 
determines the priorities of the national delega-
tions. Consequently the Commission can imple-
ment its more technical proposals for a more out-
come-orientated and conditional spending policy 
with more intense evaluation and monitoring. 
 The member-states will reject the Commission’s 
proposals for a fundamental overhaul of the own 
resources mechanisms and especially the introduc-
tion of an EU tax. They will at best postpone a 
decision on this to a later round. 
 Unless the financial and debt crisis suddenly wors-
ens in the second half of 2012, the negotiating pro-
cess will not conclude as planned (and as required 
for the EU Structural Funds and the operational 
programs of the regions to start in time) in Novem-
Familiar procedures and script 
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ber or December 2012 with an agreement in the 
European Council. The efforts of the President of 
European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the 
Cypriot Presidency to meet this deadline will be in 
vain. But the failure of the heads of state and gov-
ernment to agree at the first attempt is part of the 
script. Consensus will not be achieved until an ex-
traordinary crisis meeting of the European Council 
in February or March 2013. 
 The European Parliament, which is kept informed 
about the progress of negotiations in the General 
Affairs Council by the respective Council Presi-
dency, must subsequently approve the heart of 
the overall package, the council regulation for the 
Multiannual Financial Framework. MEPs will ini-
tially pour criticism over the agreement reached by 
the heads of state and government and reject it as 
completely inadequate. The Irish Council Presi-
dency and the leaders of the political groups in the 
European Parliament are in line for tough negotia-
tions that will drag on until May 2013. MEPs will 
call for spending to be increased, which the Council 
will reject because that would mean straying too far 
from the compromise signed off by the heads of 
state and government. After several rounds of talks 
a number of concessions will be granted, such as 
increasing the flexibility instruments and the Euro-
pean Globalisation Fund. But the total volume of 
the Financial Framework agreed by the European 
Council will remain fundamentally unaltered, with 
the European Parliament at most gaining cosmetic 
corrections. 
Altogether, it can be predicted that all parties in-
volved will approve a budget package and the outlines 
of the next Financial Framework will remain relatively 
close to the present status quo. Fundamental fiscal 
issues, such as major transfers between existing bud-
get headings or the introduction of a new source of 
own resources in the form of an EU tax, will be put on 
the back burner or shunted into slow-moving reform 
procedures. The negotiating process will obey familiar 
patterns of behaviour and well-known conflicts and 
groupings will determine the debate. 
Familiar procedures and script 
Let us now take a closer look at this oft-rehearsed 
negotiating process. What conflicts dominate, what 
steps have already been taken, and how are the roles 
distributed? What are the informal plot lines and 
their unspoken rules? 
Difficult circumstances: The political and economic 
conditions for compromise have steadily deteriorated 
over the past two decades. The negotiations over the 
first package in 1988 occurred during a phase of eco-
nomic prosperity and under the fragile political 
stability of the Cold War. The next package, Delors-2, 
by contrast was negotiated during the insecurity and 
instability following the upheavals of 1989/90, where 
it was already foreseeable that the advantageous situ-
ation of the biggest net payer, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, was set to deteriorate. The background for 
the negotiations over the third Multiannual Financial 
Framework, the Agenda 2000, was equally troubled, 
with the European Commission under Jacques Santer 
forced to resign over accusations of corruption and 
nepotism, the conflict in former Yugoslavia escalating 
with the NATO bombing of Serbia, and the upcoming 
eastern expansion facing the EU with great political, 
economic, social and budgetary challenges. The last 
round to date, in 2004/2005 for the current Financial 
Framework, was overshadowed by stormy internal 
distribution conflicts and new problems arising 
through globalisation.12
Longer negotiating period: Since the negotiations 
for Delors-1, which ended after pretty much exactly 
twelve months with an extraordinary meeting of the 
European Council on 11/12 February 1988 in Brussels, 
the talks have grown ever more protracted. The last 
round took nearly two years and was not completed 
until 16/17 December 2005. The reasons for this in-
clude significantly greater public attention, which 
increases the pressure on decision-makers to maximise 
national gains and hold out as long as possible for 
maximum demands. The repeatedly expanded EU now 
also has many more parties at the negotiating table, 
all of whom possess a veto. That considerably hampers 
the process of finding compromise. 
 
Traditional conflicts: Traditional lines of conflict 
have become ingrained in the negotiations. Although 
the opposition between net payers and net receivers 
is paramount there are also distribution conflicts 
between individual policy areas, especially agriculture 
and cohesion. Alongside tensions between the eco-
nomically strong northern European member-states 
and the traditionally more backward southern Euro-
 
12  Peter Becker, “Fortschreibung des Status quo – Die EU 
und ihr neuer Finanzrahmen”, integration 29, no. 2 (2006): 
106–21. 
The EU Budget Negotiation System 
SWP Berlin 
The EU’s Next Multiannual Financial Framework (2014–2020) 
October 2012 
 
 
 
10 
pean countries, eastward expansion has added a 
dimension of East-West distribution conflict. All these 
frictions regularly manifest themselves in specific 
legal and implementation issues within individual 
policies: for example, which agricultural products 
should be subsidised from the EU budget and how 
generously, or what criteria should be used to dis-
tribute the European Structural Funds. 
Such conflicts proliferate when a top-down ap-
proach limits the sum to be distributed from the 
outset,13 as chosen by the European Commission for 
its current proposal which caps the total volume of 
the MFF at about 1 percent of EU GNP. Certain net 
receivers understandably criticised the Commission’s 
decision as premature. The Polish Presidency chose 
neither to raise this point during the initial sessions 
in the General Affairs Council nor to include it in its 
interim report of December 2011.14 The subsequent 
Danish Presidency, on the other hand, prioritised this 
approach as a guiding principle in its first negotiating 
session on 27 January 2012.15
From the perspective of the governments and 
parliaments of the member-states, the net balance 
remains the decisive point for assessing the outcome. 
National negotiating strategies are consequently char-
acterised by the relationship between gross payments 
into the EU budget via the EU’s own resources mecha-
nism and the returns from EU spending programmes, 
especially under the two largest budget headings.
 
16
 
13  The top down approach first defines the maximum avail-
able budget volume without reference to wishes or require-
ments. Only then are tasks given priorities and funds distrib-
uted among the various spending headings of the financial 
framework. The bottom up approach, on the other hand, first 
lists the EU’s upcoming challenges and the tasks the member-
states have entrusted to the expanded EU, before calculating 
how much money is required to fulfil these tasks, wishes and 
requirements. 
 
14  Council of the European Union, Multiannual Financial 
Framework (2014–2020) – Report on Progress of Work within the 
Council in the Second Semester 2011, 17448/1/11 (Brussels, 
1 December 2011). 
15  Council of the European Union, Multiannual Financial 
Framework (2014–2020) – Questionnaire on the Main Priorities and 
the Budgetary Framework, Including the Overall Amounts, 5380/12 
(Brussels, 20 January 2012). 
16  One undeniable sign of this is that the member-states now 
possess computer-based calculating tools that they use during 
the negotiations to directly calculate the repercussions of spe-
cific reform proposals on their net balance, especially shifts 
and reallocations within the EU budget. This applies espe-
cially during the final phase of the negotiations in the Euro-
pean Council, when the dynamism of deals speeds up and 
binding political compromises must be forged. The success 
Thus France, as a major net payer, seeks to restrict 
the volume of the EU budget while at the same time, 
as the biggest recipient of agricultural spending, 
retaining a special interest in defending the CAP sub-
sidies in the EU budget. Paris therefore frequently 
points to possibilities for making savings in the Euro-
pean Structural Funds. Because significant resources 
from these still flow into its eastern states in particu-
lar, Germany for its part seeks to avoid tangible cuts 
in funding volumes that would reduce its returns and 
worsen the German net balance. The Finnish govern-
ment is in a similar position, declaring its openness 
for cuts in all policy areas including the Structural 
Funds but seeking exceptions for the thinly populated 
Lapp regions of its far north. The British follow a 
comparable logic, but focusing on the revenue side 
because their budget rebate always reduces the British 
net payment regardless of their returns from Euro-
pean spending programmes. In short, the focus on 
national net balances affects the EU’s spending 
priorities. 
Practised procedure: The negotiating process follows 
a well-trodden informal course with various assigned 
roles.17 At the beginning the European Commission 
uses its monopoly of initiative to mark out the scope 
of the negotiations and attempts to embed its own 
substantive objectives and initiatives. After that the 
member-states dominate the talks in the General 
Affairs Council.18
 
of a negotiating strategy may thus depend in part on the 
quality of the computer software used. 
 The European Council’s involvement 
is initially restricted to being kept regularly informed 
about progress. The heads of state and government 
only become actively involved when an agreement 
on the whole package is in the offing or stalled nego-
tiations need to be set in motion again. Consensus-
finding in the European Council forms the political 
17  Brigid Laffan, “The Big Budgetary Bargains: from Nego-
tiation to Authority”, Journal of European Public Policy 7, no. 5 
(2000): 725–43. Laffan speaks of an European budgetary 
acquis. 
18  The General Affairs Council, in which the foreign and 
Europe ministers of the member-states meet, still retains 
the leading role in the budget talks and has resisted takeover 
attempts by the finance ministers and the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council. This division of roles means that 
the negotiating strategies of the member-states have a more 
European orientation and are more focussed on an overall 
compromise. The negotiations should not be determined 
by budgetary aspects alone, but by the search for a balance 
between fiscal cost/benefit considerations and the integration 
of EU policies. 
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conclusion of the negotiating processes between the 
member-states. Only then, in the phase of passing 
the package into law, does the European Parliament 
become directly involved in the negotiations.19
The shadow script: Behind the specifics, an unspoken 
dramaturgy for the negotiating process has emerged. 
After assessing the Commission’s proposal and a gen-
eral airing of views among the member-states, the 
negotiations concentrate on specific policy areas and 
questions of detail. Because these talks follow the 
general principle of multilateral package negotiations, 
where nothing is agreed until all points have been 
covered, the various negotiating strands must in the 
end be brought back together. The negotiating box 
serves as the instrument for this. This unofficial 
working document (non-paper) under the responsi-
bility of the Council Presidency is presented in the 
format of conclusions of the European Council and 
forms the basis for the step-by-step search for com-
promises reconciling opposing national positions. 
Once this has reduced the list of open questions and 
unresolved conflicts to a manageable number, the 
package is presented to the European Council for the 
final round. But before the heads of state and govern-
ment reach agreement, a phase of stagnation usually 
intervenes where the foreign ministers are unable to 
achieve further progress. The European Council’s first 
attempt to agree an overall compromise usually fails 
too, upping the pressure on all involved to reach con-
sensus. At the same time this helps the heads of state 
and government to justify the final outcome to their 
own populations and national media and to demon-
strate convincingly that they fought to the last for 
their own national financial and budget interests. 
After matters have come to a head agreement is gen-
erally reached at the second attempt, often after long 
and conflictual bi- and multilateral talks and repeated 
rows during the concluding summit meeting of the 
heads of state and government. 
 
 
 
 
19  Under the Treaty of Lisbon the Financial Framework 
now requires a regulation to be legally binding. Previously 
this was always achieved through an inter-institutional 
agreement between the EU’s three organs: Council, Parlia-
ment and Commission. Peter Becker, “Eine Finanzverfassung 
für die EU: Die neue Balance zwischen Rat und Parlament 
im Haushaltsverfahren”, in Interinstitutionelle Vereinbarungen 
in der Europäischen Union: Wegbereiter der Verfassungsentwicklung, 
ed. Daniela Kietz et al. (Baden-Baden, 2010), 252–76. 
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Reform: Need and Willingness 
 
So at the end of the process there will be a result, 
if not necessarily the best or most desirable, and 
the European Union will have once again proven its 
ability to come to a decision when required. So why 
does the criticism of the EU’s budget and finance sys-
tem not go away? Why are fundamental reforms so 
consistently advised and demanded? This raises two 
interlinked two questions: 
 At what points in the European budget and finance 
system is the need for fundamental change rec-
ognised, and who expresses this need for reform? 
 If the European Union’s organs and decision-
makers recognise the need for reform, why are 
they unwilling or unable to channel this insight 
into political change? 
The criticisms of the EU budget and the 
need for reform 
Discussion about the necessity and practicability 
of reforming the EU budget has been going on for 
decades,20
The probably best-known (and most frequently 
cited) criticism of recent years originates from a group 
of advisers to the European Commission led by the 
Belgian economist André Sapir. Their report, “An 
Agenda for a Growing Europe”, published in 2003, 
calls the EU budget a “historical relic”: “Expenditures, 
 often pointing to apparent structural 
deficits that, it is said, cannot be rectified by mere 
tinkering. In what has become a broad-based discus-
sion, it is conspicuous that while critics largely agree 
about what comprises the false incentives on the 
spending side, opinions diverge more widely where 
the revenue side is concerned. Here the debate re-
volves around the possible introduction of a new 
source of own resources about which the EU could 
decide more autonomously, in other words an EU tax. 
 
20  Standing for the German debate: Gero Pfennig, “Eine neue 
Finanzverfassung für die EG – Basis für eine föderative Euro-
päische Union”, integration 9, no. 4 (1986): 143–55; for the 
debate at the European level: Report of the Study Group on the 
Role of Public Finance in European Integration (MacDougall report) 
(Brussels, April 1977). 
revenues and procedures are all inconsistent with the 
present and future state of EU integration.”21
The wide-ranging spectrum of criticisms and spe-
cific complaints can be summarised as follows:
 
22
 The volume of the Multiannual Financial Frame-
work presently comprises about 1 percent of EU 
GNP, and the annual budgets usually lie below that. 
The EU-27 possesses a much smaller budget than 
some of its member-states: the €126.5 billion figure 
for 2011, for example represented only roughly 41 
percent of the German national budget. So from 
the very outset the budget limits the room for ma-
noeuvre available to the EU, whose most important 
political instrument would be precisely the possi-
bility to grant financial assistance and set incen-
tives. 
 
 Setting budget headings and their funding for 
seven years makes the budget inflexible. Because 
the total volume of the MFF is limited and the 
shares of the individual policy areas are fixed, the 
Union can respond only slowly to new challenges, 
and only through transfers between headings. Only 
every seven years is it possible to realign European 
spending priorities or to correct the budget to redis-
tribute burdens or adapt to new external or inter-
nal circumstances. It is almost impossible to carry 
unspent funds over from one financial year to the 
next or transfer them between budget headings, as 
that requires reopening a consensus achieved in 
long drawn-out talks, renegotiating the issue and 
 
21  An Agenda for a Growing Europe: Making the EU Economic Sys-
tem Deliver, Report of an Independent High-level Study Group Estab-
lished on the Initiative of the President of the European Commission 
(Sapir report) (Brussels, July 2003), 162. 
22  See, among many: Alan Mayhew, “The EU Budget: Not 
‘Fit for Purpose’ but Change is Afoot, Gradually”, in After the 
Crisis: A New Socio-economic Settlement for the EU, ed. Roger Liddle 
(London: Policy Network, 2009), 63–76; Rolf Caesar, “Die 
Finanzwirtschaft in der EU – ‘Historisches Relikt’ oder solide 
Zukunftsbasis?” Zeitschrift für Politik 53, no. 3 (2006): 333–52; 
Daniel Tarschys (ed.), The EU Budget: What Should Go In? What 
Should Go Out? SIEPS report 3 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute 
for European Policy Studies, May 2011); Friedrich Heine-
mann, Philipp Mohl, and Steffen Osterloh, “Reforming the 
EU Budget: Reconciling Needs with Political-Economic Con-
straints”, Journal of European Integration 32, no. 1 (2010): 59–76. 
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reaching a new compromise among the 27 member-
states and the consent of the European Parliament. 
 On the spending side most of the EU’s limited 
resources are consumed by just two policies that 
serve principally redistributive ends. The Common 
Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds con-
sume about 78 percent of all spending from the 
Financial Framework, leaving less resources or none 
at all for modern, innovative projects. To this extent 
the European budget appears to be neither pre-
pared for the challenges of globalisation nor orien-
tated on the expectations of the EU’s citizens.23
 Relatively prosperous member-states enjoy funding 
and subsidies under the two largest headings of the 
EU budget. Funds are thus distributed not by crite-
ria of standard of living or need but according to 
the logic of European package negotiations. In such 
package deals, support for an overall compromise is 
often bought by promises of compensation.
 
24
 On the revenue side the EU budget suffers from 
lack of transparency, unnecessary complexity and 
inflexibility. EU funding is governed by corrections 
and rebates originating from package deals that 
follow no rational logic. The best-known is the Brit-
ish budget rebate, which guarantees the United 
Kingdom the reimbursement of two thirds of its 
net contributions.
 
25
 The EU possesses hardly any own resources worthy 
of the name. Almost 90 percent of the EU budget 
comes from the member-states’ national budgets. 
The European Union has no right of its own to raise 
taxes and is forbidden to borrow. So also on the 
revenue side it can respond only slowly and cum-
bersomely to changing circumstances and new 
challenges. The member-states place narrow limits 
on its budget policy and make it dependent on 
funds from its members. 
 
 
23  European Commission, Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011: 
Europeans and the EU Budget (Brussels, August 2011). 
24  Susanne Neheider, Die Kompensationsfunktion der EU-Finanzen 
(Baden-Baden, 2010). 
25  The British budget rebate was agreed in 1984 after diffi-
cult negotiations in the European Council at Fontainebleau. 
Because repeated amendments have made it extremely com-
plicated, the member-states adopted a working document at 
the proposal of the European Commission. Council of the 
European Union, Commission Working Document on Calculation, 
Financing, Payment and Entry in the Budget of the Correction of 
Budgetary Imbalances In Favour of the United Kingdom (“the UK 
Correction”) in Accordance with Articles 4 and 5 of Council Decision 
2006/xxx/EC, Euratom on the System of the European Communities’ 
Own Resources, 9851/ 07, ADD 2 (Brussels, 23 May 2007). 
 Unlike the nation-states, the EU has no comprehen-
sive budget legitimised by parliament. While the 
changes associated with the Lisbon Treaty enhance 
the role of the European Parliament on the spend-
ing side by granting it equal rights to the Council of 
the European Union, the member-states still domi-
nate on the revenue side. The EU’s budget and 
finance system thus represents a hybrid form with 
adequate parliamentary legitimisation at the Euro-
pean level only on the spending side. 
 The biggest criticism is without doubt the way 
member-states think in net balance categories.26 
This “poisonous”27 fixation on net positions is of 
limited sense, the critics say, because it takes no 
account of other effects of European integration 
and EU membership that cannot be expressed in 
a purely fiscal juxtaposition of payment and re-
ceipt.28
While these criticisms are not all shared en bloc by 
all political, economic and scholarly commentators, 
 Moreover, thinking in net balances cements 
the status-quo orientation of the member-states and 
leads to tangible negative medium- to long-term 
consequences. The discussion about what the EU 
should spend its money on becomes dominated by a 
balance sheet of short-term cost-benefit calculations 
that neglects the question of the usefulness and 
longer-term advantages of European policies and 
funding. The criterion of European added value 
remains largely marginal to national negotiating 
stances. This orientation on fiscal aspects of the 
EU budget creates a system equipped with an ever 
growing number of adjusting levers, without which 
no compromises would ever be reached. Thinking 
in terms of net balances is therefore a source of 
exceptions to the rules and of growing complexity 
and lack of transparency in the European budget 
and funding system. Once introduced, corrections 
tend to become entrenched. It is not only the adapt-
ability of the EU budget that suffers, but also the 
political viability of the EU as a whole. 
 
26  See, among many: Peter Becker, Der EU-Finanzrahmen  
2007–2013: Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Finanzverfassung 
oder Fortsetzung der nationalen Nettosaldopolitik? SWP-Studie 36/ 
2005 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 
2005). 
27  Jacques Le Cacheux, European Budget: The Poisonous Budget 
Rebate Debate, Studies & Research; 41 (Paris: Notre Europe, 
June 2005). 
28  Lars P. Feld and Sarah Necker, Fiskalföderalismus in der Euro-
päischen Union: Herausforderungen für die Reform der Finanzverfas-
sung der EU (Brussels, 2010). 
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there is a broad consensus that reform and adaptation 
are urgently needed and that the existing European 
budget and finance system must be made to function 
more smoothly. 
Necessity of reform does not necessarily 
mean ability to reform 
Decision-makers in the EU organs and the member-
states fundamentally agree that the European budget 
and finance system needs to be reformed, as repeat-
edly demanded by the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the European Council of 
heads of state and government. For all its contradic-
tions and disagreements,29 the reform discussion of 
2007/08 certainly documented the need to overhaul 
the EU’s budgetary instruments.30
What was at that stage the largest public consul-
tation held by the European Union, and the debate 
during the ongoing review process, produced an ex-
tensive and diverse collection of reform proposals.
 
31 
The European Commission’s report ultimately argues 
for all future spending from the EU budget to be much 
more strongly guided by efficiency criteria and for 
flexibilisation of the Multiannual Financial Frame-
work. “The modernisation of the EU budget must 
therefore be about targeting, about maximising the 
benefits from every euro spent, and about setting 
the budget firmly in the context of the other ways in 
which the European Union, its institutions and its 
Member States, can put Europe on the path to growth 
and jobs for the future.”32
 
29  Peter Becker, Auf dem Weg zur Reform des EU-Haushalts: Eine 
Zwischenbilanz des Konsultationsprozesses, SWP-Aktuell 57/2008 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2008); Rolf 
Caesar, “Der ‘Budget Review’ 2008/2009: Durchgreifende 
Reformen im EU-Haushalt?” Wirtschaftsdienst 88, no. 5 (2008): 
317–21. 
 Nevertheless, the review 
30  Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel was reported to 
have said: “Next time we’ll be going for each other’s throats”, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31 December 2005; similarly Wolfgang 
Schüssel, Europas Finanzen – Das alte System ist ausgereizt, spot-
light europe 2007/08 (Gütersloh and Munich, November 
2007). 
31  This reform debate produced more than three hundred 
statements from governments, associations, institutions, civil 
society groups and individual scholars. Statements submitted 
during the European Commission’s public consultations are 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform2008/issues/ 
read_en.htm. 
32  European Commission, The EU Budget Review, COM(2010) 
700 final (Brussels, 19 October 2010). 
process produced no fundamental political decisions 
to change the European budget arrangements. The 
consultation phase had demonstrated all too clearly 
that the EU organs, the member-states and also the 
many interest groups and NGOs were incapable of 
discussing the budget review in isolation from the 
budget negotiation process. National governments in 
particular interpreted the review as an early starting 
shot for the MFF 2014–2020 talks, and tactical con-
siderations automatically permeated the national 
position papers. The collective European desire for 
reform was unable to prevail against national inter-
ests and sectoral and civil society preferences. 
Nor was the Commission’s final report, published a 
year behind schedule, able to paper over the substan-
tive and temporal closeness to the actual budget nego-
tiations. While the Commission supported certain 
innovative proposals and attempted to draw funda-
mental lessons for the European budget and finance 
system, it avoided taking clear positions or setting 
clear priorities. On the one hand it demanded that the 
principle of European added value be the yardstick of 
all EU spending. On the other it demanded consolidat-
ing the principle of European solidarity as the corner-
stone of all community policies. It was certainly aware 
that in the course of the review discussions these two 
precepts had become the opposing slogans of the two 
camps. The net payers instrumentalised “European 
added value” to argue for a restriction of the budget 
volume. The net receivers appealed to “European soli-
darity” to insist on increasing European spending and 
subsidies.33
In the meantime simply completing the compli-
cated and conflictual negotiating process with any 
kind of compromise appears more important than 
negotiating an agreement that satisfies requirements 
and wishes for a future EU. Successful conclusion of 
the process has turned into the actual objective of the 
negotiating processes and the collective bottom line. 
Reforms and the substance of the agreement have 
received short shrift. 
 
All involved agree fundamentally that the Financial 
Framework must be thoroughly crisis-proofed and pre-
pared for meeting future challenges. Although the 
EU budget will certainly not in the foreseeable future 
become a crisis response instrument with which the 
Union and its member-states could tangibly stimulate 
 
33  Peter Becker, “The European Budget and the Principles of 
Solidarity and Added Value”, International Spectator 47, no. 3 
(September 2012): 116–29. 
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growth, the MFF could still serve as a supplementary 
and supporting instrument offering incentives and 
assistance for medium- to long-term structural re-
forms in the member-states. European incentives for 
sustainable and intelligent economic growth could 
lend support to national budget consolidation pro-
cesses. At least that is the goal the European Commis-
sion is pursuing with its proposal for a “Budget for 
Europe 2020”, and which the European Parliament 
confirms in calling for European resources to be iden-
tifiably applied to the European growth and employ-
ment strategy. The EU budget should have a “strong 
catalytic effect” for more growth and employment in 
the EU.34
In the long term the MFF should support the Euro-
pean Union on its way to becoming an “ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe”. But this pre-
supposes that the member-states cease regarding the 
Financial Framework from the selfish perspective of 
their national net balances. In moving towards the 
ultimate goal of a Political Union, it is not enough to 
simply build a fiscal union and introduce institutional 
reforms for greater legitimacy of the EU organs. The 
Multiannual Financial Framework must be also devel-
oped into a constitutive component and an instru-
ment for autonomous political action. 
 It would definitely be wrong to throw away 
the possibility of using the (admittedly restricted) 
resources of the MFF to tackle the current challenges 
faced by the EU. Accepting the failure of the negotia-
tions is equally out of the question, for especially in 
times of vanishing trust in the EU’s capacity to inter-
vene decisively or institute reforms this would repre-
sent a fatal signal at the worst conceivable time. 
 
 
 
34  European Commission, A Budget For Europe 2020 
(see note 1). 
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Starting Points for Reforming the EU Budget 
 
Although the forces of inertia and scepticism about 
changes to the status quo still dominate, the shared 
insight of political decision-makers remains that the 
European budget and finance system requires struc-
tural modifications. Yet the hurdles appear too high 
for a political turnabout. 
Evolutionary adaptation and gradual change 
Normally change occurs as an evolutionary process 
of incremental modifications: the gradual adaptation 
of existing institutions, processes and structures, 
triggered or amplified by institutional learning pro-
cesses.35 Alterations to the negotiating situation and 
framework and their perception by the actors can also 
be sources of change, and this in turn can have con-
sequences for the definition of member-states’ prefer-
ences and interests.36
In view of the political, economic and financial im-
portance of the MFF, the member-states negotiate at 
the highest political level in the European Council. 
But twenty-seven heads of state and government 
means twenty-seven potential vetoes. The greater their 
number the smaller the prospect of sweeping reform, 
especially where budgetary decisions are involved.
 
37
 
35  Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and 
Social Analysis (Princeton, 2004), 137ff. See also Richard Deeg, 
“Change from Within: German and Italian Finance in the 
1990s”, Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced 
Political Economies, ed. Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen 
(Oxford, 2005), 169–202 (170ff). Deeg lists “learning effects”, 
“coordination effects” and “adaptive expectations” as self-
reinforcing mechanisms. 
 
Moreover, the further apart the negotiating positions 
the greater the tendency to adhere to the status quo. 
The great discrepancy between the negotiating posi-
36  Schild, “How to Shift the EU’s Spending Priorities?” 
(see note 11), 546. 
37  George Tsebelis, “Decision Making in Political Systems: 
Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicam-
eralism and Multipartyism”, British Journal of Political Science 24, 
no. 3 (1995): 289–325; George Tsebelis and Eric C. C. Chang, 
“Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in Advanced In-
dustrialized Countries”, European Journal of Political Research 43, 
no. 3 (2004): 449–76. 
tions of net payers and net receivers, as reflected in 
their net balances, reduces the willingness to accept 
change. Both sides fix their positions at an early stage 
according to their net payments, increasing their resis-
tance to reform. The status quo becomes the lowest 
common denominator. 
However, the veto player theorem can also be ap-
plied to advantage. If the opposing standpoints of 
the member-states move closer and their negotiating 
positions thus become more coherent, the likelihood 
that they will agree on change increases.38 Currently 
respective net balances determine what positions the 
member-states will adopt in the budget negotiations. 
So the first step would be to minimise the redistribu-
tion volume of the EU budget and the differences 
between the net balances. To this end the Commission 
and European Parliament are calling for an autono-
mous source of own resources, to make part of the 
EU budget independent from the payments from the 
national budgets and thus bracket it out from the net 
balance calculations.39
Another possibility would be to cap net payments, 
for example through a generalised mechanism for 
correcting budgetary imbalances of the kind the Euro-
pean Commission proposed in the last negotiating 
round in 2004.
 
40
 
38  By contrast the conclusion that the number of veto 
players must first be reduced in order to lessen the influence 
and blocking options of individual actors in the negotiations 
appears extremely unrealistic. That would imply the intro-
duction of majority voting for the budget negotiations. It is 
unlikely that a member-state would agree to such a reduction 
of its influence where under Article 312(2) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union voting modalities can 
only be altered unanimously. 
 It would cap the contributions of all 
net payers at a given threshold (defined in percent of 
national GNP) and partially reimburse net contribu-
39  Calculations by the European Commission estimate that 
its proposed European financial transaction tax alone would 
reduce the GNP contributions of the member-states by €54 
billion by 2020. 
40  European Commission, Financing the European Union – 
Commission Report on the Operation of the Own Resources System, 
COM(2004) 505 final (Brussels, 14 July 2004). On the details 
of the proposal see Becker, Der EU-Finanzrahmen 2007–2013 (see 
note 26), 16–18. 
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tions exceeding the threshold, thus fundamentally 
limiting the redistribution volume of the EU budget.41
The biggest difficulties here stem from the special 
privilege claimed by the United Kingdom with its in-
definite rebate mechanism, granted in 1984 in Fon-
tainebleau. According to calculations by the European 
Commission the United Kingdom would be the biggest 
loser from the introduction of a generalised correction 
mechanism,
 
42 because its special position would be 
relativised in comparison to other net payers.43 In 
order for the United Kingdom to agree to a generalised 
correction mechanism, its long-standing demand for 
fundamental overhaul of the Common Agricultural 
Policy would have to be granted in return. From the 
British perspective a reform to tangibly reduce direct 
payments to farmers would be a victory that would 
sell well domestically. The symbolically important 
first step towards national co-financing of agricultural 
direct payments no longer appears to be the decisive 
sticking point.44
 
41  However, for the current negotiations the Commission 
has put its generalised correction mechanism proposals on 
ice and instead proposes introducing temporary lump sum 
corrections limited to the duration of the Financial Frame-
work for the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Sweden. European Commission, Proposal for a 
Council Decision on the System of Own Resources of the European 
Union, COM(2011) 510 final (Brussels, 29 June 2011). In its 
accompanying document the Commission justifies this pro-
posal on the basis that temporary lump sums for individual 
member-states are more comprehensible, more transparent 
and easier to apply than a generalised correction mechanism. 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper: Financ-
ing the EU Budget: Report on the Operation of the Own Resources Sys-
tem, SEC(2011) 876 final (Brussels, 29 June 2011), 47ff. 
 
42  Domestically the British government could portray the 
introduction of an indefinite generalised correction mecha-
nism as the continuation of its budget rebate, which had 
simply been extended to a few other states – presuming it 
was willing to negotiate the rebate question at all. A tempo-
rary generalised correction mechanism would be absolutely 
out of the question for the United Kingdom.  
43  Calculations by the Commission in 2004 showed that 
the British rebate would have roughly halved at the time. The 
European Commission’s new proposal for temporary lump 
sum corrections would reduce the British rebate from the 
current capped maximum of €10.5 billion to €3.6 billlion. 
This drastic reduction would be a consequence of the Com-
mission’s proposal to introduce a new source of own re-
sources in the form of an EU tax, which would significantly 
reduce the national GNP contributions subject to rebates. 
44  In its report on the EU budget negotiations the House 
of Lords relativised the importance of co-financing in direct 
payments – saying they were not a “panacea” – and priori-
tised reducing direct payments. In the event of such a com-
But national co-financing in the CAP would provoke 
political outrage in France, with such a “renationalisa-
tion” of agricultural policy triggering massive and 
very emotional cross-party reactions might well cul-
minate in a complete boycott of all reform efforts or 
even of the MFF negotiations.45 The CAP remains so 
enormously symbolic for la France rurale, and thus for 
French domestic politics, that it will be impossible 
to implement fundamental changes such as national 
co-financing against the French. The realistic option 
would be to pursue smaller, almost imperceptible 
changes without great symbolic significance, sup-
ported by new additional instruments for redistribut-
ing CAP resources. One way out for the French govern-
ment might be to continue slowly reducing the direct 
payments of the first CAP pillar while at the same 
time and in the same scope expanding the second, co-
financed rural development pillar. Such an approach 
would permit the modernisation of the policy in line 
with political realities while allowing Paris to point to 
the CAP’s unchanged importance in the EU budget. 
One new instrument here could be a European risk 
fund to protect farmers against the vagaries and vola-
tility of the global agricultural commodity markets, 
as long demanded by France. Depending on its details, 
the idea floated by the Commission of a greening fac-
tor in the first pillar could offer a flexible instrument 
for reconciling British and Swedish modernisation 
demands with Franco-German stabilisation interests.46
Alongside the Franco-British aspect there would 
also have to be compensation for the other net re-
ceivers in southern and eastern Europe. This would 
only be possible in the realm of the European Struc-
tural Funds. Backward regions in these member-states 
could be supported by two routes through the EU bud-
get: firstly by reducing co-financing rates to provide 
relief to national budgets, and secondly by reconfigur-
ing funding priorities, which would occur at the 
 
 
prehensive reform of the first pillar of the CAP the British 
Upper House even indicated its willingness to countenance 
the end of the British rebate. House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, 13th Report of Session 2010–2011, EU Financial Frame-
work from 2014, HL Paper 125 (London, 5 April 2011). 
45  At the least extensive compensation for France and Euro-
pean farmers would be required, which would counteract the 
reform gains. 
46  In its package of proposals the European Commission 
argues for coupling 30 percent of the direct payments to 
sustainable ecological agriculture as greening components. 
Examples include landscape management through ecological 
focus areas, avoidance of monoculture through improved 
crop rotation and the preservation of permanent pasture. 
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expense of regions in the more prosperous member-
states of western and northern Europe. Such a sacri-
fice is, however, almost inconceivable because it 
would worsen their net balances. Capping contribu-
tions with a generalised correction mechanism might 
limit the effect, but at the expense of exacerbating the 
domestic political repercussions of the common pool 
problem,47
These distorted incentives also lead to a situation 
where national or regional self-interest increasingly 
supplants the idea of joint funding of European public 
goods.
 where the special character of the Euro-
pean Union as a multi-level system with complex and 
opaque finances creates incentives to expand the bud-
get or at least not to change it. The interest of national 
and regional politicians and administrators in in-
creasing the resources available for jointly funded 
European spending policies inevitably grows if their 
own constituency, region or country is likely to 
benefit from transfers. This tendency arises out of 
the asymmetry between the sourcing and benefits 
of shared funds. 
48 A prime example is the demand of the Ger-
man states to leave the European cohesion policy un-
changed. While Germany’s contributions to the EU 
budget originate exclusively from the national budget, 
payments from the European Structural Funds flow 
largely into state budgets.49
The negotiations need to focus on increasing the 
efficiency and added value of deployed resources by 
applying EU funds more precisely and effectively. 
 It requires no great leap 
to comprehend that these beneficiaries are eager to 
secure inflows to whose funding they need not con-
tribute. While the German government could employ 
a generalised correction mechanism to place a ceiling 
on its net contribution and shield its national budget, 
this would leave the federal state budgets struggling 
with revenue losses – in the context of immense pres-
sure to make savings because of the German and 
European “debt brakes”. 
 
47  Friedrich Heinemann, “Das common pool-Problem in der 
EU-Finanzverfassung”, Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissen-
schaften 4, no. 2 (2006): 188–213. 
48  Heinemann also shows that EU enlargement has further 
worsened the common pool problem. Ibid., 197. 
49  The German government currently has two programmes 
of its own that rely on the EU Structural Funds: an ESF pro-
gramme with a volume of €3.5 billion and an ERDF pro-
gramme for funding the national transport development 
plan with a volume of €1.5 billion. So of approximately 
€26.4 billion from the European Structural Funds to which 
Germany is entitled in the 2007–2013 funding period, only 
€5 billion or 19 percent flow back into the federal budget. 
More flexible ways need to be found to modify fund-
ing programmes and spending priorities, and to adapt 
them more quickly to changing circumstances. But 
the goal of achieving a more efficient funding policy 
without increasing its volume will only be achievable 
if the outcomes are more closely monitored and con-
ditionalities applied. In order to make EU funding 
measures more effective, member-states would have 
to permit sharper monitoring of their programmes, 
tighter supervision of national implementation, and 
stricter evaluation and success controls. These heavily 
technical/administrative issues are discussed not in 
the actual MFF negotiations themselves, but in the 
talks about the new Structural Funds regulations. 
However, the two formally separate negotiating pro-
cesses will have to be coordinated even more closely 
with one another. Technical details of the Structural 
Fund regulations are to be subordinated to this gen-
eral strategy of gaining more efficiency. 
There is, however, a double misunderstanding that 
causes participants to hold fast to known and familiar 
procedures and avoid making a start with fundamen-
tal changes and comprehensive reforms: 
Firstly, the potential advantages of structural 
reform of the European budget and finance system 
appear to be a long-term matter at best, while the 
foreseeable drawbacks of new distribution conflicts 
or even delays in agreeing a new budget compromise 
will be immediately obvious in the negotiations. 
Secondly, the interest in comprehensive reform 
and the possibilities of enforcement are unequally 
distributed. Greater budgetary autonomy, a larger EU 
budget or spending policy reform would in the first 
place strengthen the EU and its organs (especially the 
European Commission), while the member-states 
would again have to relinquish national sovereignty 
and domestic budgetary latitude. And it is the mem-
ber-states that largely decide whether to strengthen 
the European institutions at the expense of their own 
powers. 
Among the member-states (and especially heads 
of state and government facing elections), interest in 
transferring powers to the European Union and its 
organs is naturally limited. The situation is further 
complicated by the fierce distribution conflicts that 
generally accompany the negotiations, incurring 
immediate political reform costs whereas integration 
gains are expected for the distant future (if at all) and 
their potential distribution remains unclear. 
It is therefore rather unlikely that the spending 
priorities of the EU budget will be fundamentally 
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redefined, as the critics repeatedly demand, to redirect 
spending to areas that promise European added value: 
education, innovation, research, external border pro-
tection or defence. In log-jammed negotiations with 
reciprocal blockades and compensation expectations, 
a substantial redistribution of resources away from 
the two biggest spending blocks, CAP and cohesion, is 
unlikely. Proposals to subdivide the budget or supple-
ment it with a parallel investment budget are also 
unrealistic.50
The path of inconspicuous gradual and sustainable 
reforms within the existing European spending prior-
ities currently appears more viable.
 
51 This was in fact 
the route the European Commission chose to break 
the logjam in 2005. The first step was to cautiously 
reduce the resources of the CAP and the cohesion 
policy and initiate a “subsidy withdrawal”. In a sec-
ond parallel step the policies were aligned with the 
new funding objectives, thus shifting the longer-term 
substantive priorities of agricultural and cohesion 
policy.52
Such a gradual functional shift could be back-
stopped by tying funding policies to the European 
climate and energy targets, for example by fixing the 
greening components in the CAP direct payments or 
 The budget headings kept their old names, 
remaining formally unchanged and retaining their 
symbolic meaning, but were used to fund new poli-
cies. The substance of the policies was gradually re-
oriented through incremental changes. Only at the 
end of the reform process and the financial “weaning” 
can the policies finally be redefined. But by that time 
this will no longer be understood as a fundamental 
change of direction. In the long run the risk of 
blockade steadily recedes. 
 
50  Charles B. Blankart and Gerrit B. Koester, “Stillstand trotz 
Reform – die politische Ökonomie des EU-Haushalts von Rom 
bis Lissabon”, in Einnahmen- und Steuerpolitik in Europa: Heraus-
forderungen und Chancen, ed. Kai A. Konrad and Tim Lohse 
(Frankfurt am Main, 2009), 13–46; Susanne Neheider and 
Indhira Santos, “Reframing the EU Budget: Decision-Making 
Process”, Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 3 (2011):  
631–51. 
51  Ebbinghaus refers to such a long-term process as a “devel-
opment pathway”. Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Can Path Dependence 
Explain Institutional Change? Two Approaches Applied to Welfare 
State Reform, MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/2 (Munich: Max-
Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2005). 
52  According to Streeck and Thelen such a process can be 
classified as “institutional conversion” where existing insti-
tutions “are redirected to new goals, functions or purposes”. 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, “Introduction: Insti-
tutional Change in Advanced Political Economies”, in Beyond 
Continuity, ed. Streeck and Thelen (see note 35), 1–39, 26. 
by setting binding funding objectives for the Struc-
tural Funds.53 It would also be especially important to 
focus future cohesion and agricultural programmes 
on the Europe 2020 strategy and the overarching eco-
nomic policy objectives of improving community and 
member-state competitiveness.54 This naturally in-
cludes close linkage, institutionally consolidated by 
the new regulations, with existing funding policies 
and the new reform goals and instruments derived 
from the lessons of the current euro crisis.55 One 
guiding principle could be to use the MFF for eco-
nomic policy response and management. Further, this 
gradual reform process must be consolidated through 
positive, self-reinforcing incentives and safety mecha-
nisms so that it does not break off, but opens up an 
alternative, irreversible road to reform.56
Such a cautiously managed process also fits with 
the traditional scepticism of political institutions and 
administrations towards fundamental and far-reach-
ing reforms. Niklas Luhmann identifies these “con-
servative traits” of administrations as a significant 
 It would 
remain sensible to make it easier to reallocate and 
carry over unused funds from one financial year to 
the next. This, too, would expand the EU’s practical 
options and increase the response speed of the 
member-states. 
 
53  The actual political benefit is simply to make any kind 
of start with redefining funding objectives. But the actual 
greening component in the first pillar of the CAP is likely 
to remain limited and possibly to be further weakened in 
implementation during the funding period. A similar process 
can be expected in the structural policy when the Structural 
Funds are brought in line with the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Here too the reformed finding priorities are ambiguously 
formulated. 
54  This is the intention of the European Commission’s 
proposals for consolidating the legal bases of the multi-year 
spending programmes in a single European legal framework 
and coordinating the strategic orientations of all the funds. 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Docu-
ment, Elements for a Common Strategic Framework 2014 to 
2020, the European Regional Development Fund, the Euro-
pean Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricul-
tural Fund for Rural Development and the European Mari-
time and Fisheries Fund, SWD(2012) 61 final, parts 1 and 2 
(Brussels, 14 March 2012).  
55  The last Financial Framework already reconciles the 
funding objectives of the European Structural Funds with 
the goals of the Lisbon strategy. Peter Becker, The Moderniza-
tion of European Cohesion Policy, SWP Research Paper 7/2009 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2009). 
56  “In such a process, moves in a particular direction can 
be self-reinforcing, making it increasingly difficult over time 
to reverse course.” Pierson, Politics in Time (see note 35), 149. 
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obstacle to far-reaching change.57
The economic crisis as a force for 
path change 
 This is exacerbated 
by the interest administrations possess in proving or 
increasing their importance through generous allo-
cation of resources. Administrations fight for “their” 
budgets and attempt to prevent cuts. This pattern is 
not only observed in the European Commission and 
its departments and services, but equally in adminis-
trations at member-state level. During the European 
budget negotiations the same distribution conflicts 
also regularly arise within national administrations 
and influence the positioning of the European Com-
mission. When coordinating their own country’s nego-
tiating position all national ministries seek to maxi-
mise the European budget heading for their own 
policy area, in order to subsequently benefit from 
European funds. 
Much more rarely, institutional change is brought 
about by a complete change of policy path, in the 
sense of a caesura and a correction of the chosen 
direction.58 Because of the foreseeable costs of change, 
such a path change will mostly require the help of 
an exogenous shock. Niklas Luhmann’s theory that 
“programmes are generally not modified in good time, 
but only when a tangible crisis looms” applies espe-
cially to complex systems:59
 
57  “Systems may thus easily end up clinging to programmes 
that have become inadequate, pursuing outdated objectives 
or responding to signs that have long lost their original 
meaning. Fundamentally the function of programmes needs 
to be continuously monitored in order to ensure that they 
are still coherent. But monitoring and modification encoun-
ter certain difficulties stemming from the specifics of the 
programmed decision-making process that are not easy to 
overcome. This introduces conservative traits into administ-
rations.” Translated from Niklas Luhmann, Politische Planung: 
Aufsätze zur Soziologie von Politik und Verwaltung, 3rd ed. (Opla-
den, 1983), 133. 
 a crisis or a single exogen-
ous event reveals the limits of the existing system, 
multiplies the political costs of clinging to existing 
structures, or uncovers new incentives that make 
changing these structures appear more profitable. 
58  See also Michael Howlett, “Process Sequencing Policy 
Dynamics: Beyond Homeostasis and Path Dependency”, 
Journal of Public Policy 29, no. 3 (2009): 241–62. 
59  Translated from Luhmann, Politische Planung (see note 57), 
133. 
The present economic and debt crisis in the Euro-
pean Union, which is frequently discussed as the 
worst and most consequential economic, institutional 
and political crisis since the beginning of the integra-
tion process, could represent such an exogenous shock 
or force for change, especially as the negotiations for 
the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework are 
being conducted simultaneously with responses to the 
crisis. However, the parallel negotiating and coordi-
nating processes are currently almost unconnected. At 
best the crisis is cited to back up traditional demands 
for a greater share of the EU budget or reductions in 
the national contribution to it. The net payers claim 
that the crisis requires European-level spending cuts 
alongside national budget consolidation efforts. The 
net receivers argue that the crisis demands the oppo-
site: increased and clearly visible European solidarity 
in the form of EU programmes. 
It must be noted that the EU budget and existing 
European spending policies offer little scope for 
responding quickly, appropriately, and focusedly to 
the crisis in the eurozone and in individual member-
states. The EU budget is plainly too small to be a use-
ful growth instrument, while the stipulation of spend-
ing priorities in the Multiannual Financial Framework 
is specifically intended to prevent resources being 
reallocated quickly and flexibly. But in a crisis exactly 
that would be necessary. 
There is an obvious contradiction between the chal-
lenges of the economic and financial crisis and the 
present functioning of the community budget. The EU 
budget pursues different objectives than those of the 
national budgets. It is designed to fund multi-year sub-
sidy programmes and principally long-term develop-
ment programmes. It is not appropriate for the fast 
and flexible responses that are needed in times of cri-
sis. So the EU budget is currently not an effective 
instrument for European crisis response.60
 
60  The MacDougall Report of 1977 supplied the first very 
early indication of the consequences of a common currency 
for economic management via the community budget. In it, 
the experts proposed supporting the common currency zone 
with a significantly expanded community budget. Even today 
there are still individual voices calling for an EU budget with 
a volume of up to 10 percent of EU GNP. One such is MEP Oth-
mar Karas (ÖVP), one of the vice-presidents of the European 
Parliament: “Die EU braucht Eigenmittel”, press release, 25 
May 2011, http://www.othmar-karas.at/de/presseaussendungen. 
php?id=787&jahr=2011. 
 What the 
Financial Framework does offer is financial and 
medium-term predictability, political and legal depen-
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dability and the particular stability of the attained 
consensus. This special added value of the current 
budget system would be called into question if the 
EU budget were to be used for flexible short-term 
crisis response. These fundamental considerations 
also mean that spending policy commitments can 
by no means be modified as unproblematically as is 
demanded. 
Nonetheless, it would be helpful to link the ongo-
ing budget negotiations with the new instruments 
for stabilising the eurozone. That could provide new 
stimuli for reforming the European budget and fi-
nance system and certainly initiate a fundamental 
transformation and functional realignment of the 
EU budget. 
European resources should be used above all to 
generate economic growth and improve competitive-
ness without unduly restricting the flexibility of 
national and regional funding priorities. Concrete 
connections should be created with the new economic 
management instruments of the European semester 
for closer economic policy coordination. 
There is good reason to believe that the roots of the 
current debt crisis lie in the inadequate competitive-
ness of certain eurozone member-states that upset the 
balance of trade and in turn led to overindebtedness 
of public budgets. If this theory is correct, the EU bud-
get could be used to establish an instrument to rectify 
these imbalances through intra-community transfers. 
It would appear sensible to tie spending from the 
European cohesion funds to an investigation of macro-
economic imbalances instead of the national pros-
perity.61 For member-states with low competitiveness 
the Commission would formulate recommendations 
for eliminating the discrepancies and improving com-
petitiveness.62
 
61  “Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the Preven-
tion and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 306, 23 November 2011, 25–32. 
 Thus the eligibility and distribution 
yardstick for cohesion spending would be the threat 
of macroeconomic imbalances rather than per-capita 
GNP. This new perspective on eligibility would also 
change the roles and opportunities of the member-
62  In the process for preventing and correcting macro-
economic imbalances the European Commission has pub-
lished its first Alert Mechanism Report analysing and evalu-
ating internal current account imbalances using a set of 
indicators (scoreboard). European Commission, Alert Mechanism 
Report: Report Prepared in Accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Regulation on the Prevention and Correction of Macro-economic 
Imbalances, COM(2012) 68 final (Brussels, 14 February 2012). 
states and Commission. The European Commission 
would acquire a decisive say in the use of EU budget 
programmes in the affected member-states: investigat-
ing imbalances, making proposals for corrective and 
preventive measures, and preparing reports assessing 
their success. Such a system should be designed to 
motivate member-states to observe the deficit criteria 
and move towards the competitiveness indicators of 
the scoreboard rather than as a sanction mechanism. 
The institutional connection between cohesion policy 
conditioning on the one side and the incentive effect 
of EU spending programmes and the preventive effect 
of the new economic governance structures on the 
other can be created only in the course of the nego-
tiations over the regulations for the European funding 
instruments. 
Nonetheless, this realignment would be a first step, 
and a turn away from the ingrained informal rules of 
the European MFF negotiations. The compensation 
function of receipts from the EU budget would decline 
and the orientation on the national net balance would 
be relativised too. The political rationale of the budget 
and the negotiations would no longer be determined 
by states demanding redistribution and having their 
consent to major European integration projects 
bought with spending promises. The guiding principle 
could instead be the collective need for economic 
management and adaptation. The budget of the Euro-
pean Union would grow piece by piece into a small 
but useful instrument for creating economic policy 
impulses. 
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Outlook 
 
The force of the euro crisis appears to be so powerful 
that the inherent flaws of the common currency and 
even the possibility of a financial transfer in the euro-
zone may now be openly discussed.63
 Should assistance within the community only be 
made available after the inception of an integra-
tion-threatening debt and economic crisis, and then 
in almost unlimited scope (as with the ESM)? Or 
should transfers be planned, preventive and cou-
pled to structural reforms with an agreed cap on 
redistribution volume (through a European finan-
cial transfer system)? 
 If the option of a 
limited European transfer union is now conceivable in 
the medium to long term, then the task today is to set 
the correct course at the beginning of this new Euro-
pean economic, currency and budgetary trajectory. In 
the course of such a debate the following questions 
will arise: 
 Who can and should be eligible for a financial 
transfer: all members of the EU or only eurozone 
states? 
 To what criteria or conditions should European 
transfers be tied? 
During the crisis Germany’s Europe policy has 
to date followed the principle of “conditional help to 
help themselves”. Berlin made its consent to the 
bailouts and to the ESM dependent on the recipients 
credibly promising to introduce structural reforms. 
The Fiscal Compact made this promise by the crisis 
states binding under international law and actionable 
before the European Court of Justice. Applied to a 
long-term restructuring of the European budget and 
finance system this strategy would mean that only 
member-states that promised to carry out the mea-
 
63  Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger reports German Bundestag 
member Rainer Stinner as saying that “despite the counter-
vailing mood of the German population and contradicting 
the official stance of the German government, a transfer 
union is coming”. Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, “Wessen Wer-
te für Europa?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 March 2012. 
Similar also Thieß Petersen, Stabilität hat ihren Preis, spotlight 
europe 2012/02 (Gütersloh and Munich, March 2012), and 
Nicolaus Heinen, Transferunion Europa: Wie groß, wie stark, wie 
teuer? Beiträge zur europäischen Integration, EU-Monitor 81 
(Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bank Research, 28 June 2011). 
sures and structural reforms proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission to improve growth and national 
competitiveness would be entitled to receive EU (or 
eurozone) transfers. 
Such an institutional coupling of structural re-
forms and financial transfers could then introduce an 
upper limit on the total volume of transfer payments 
and guarantee their effective use. This would be the 
first step towards a restricted-volume community 
financial transfer mechanism linked to the Union’s 
new economic management instruments. 
In all events, an instrumentalisation of the crisis 
and the budget negotiations for disintegrative pur-
poses must be avoided. The goal of gradual institu-
tional transformation cannot be the re-nationalization 
of policies through slow financial starvation. Instead, 
the current crisis should be used to advance long-term 
integration of joint economic, budget and finance 
policy. Further down the line a truly federal financial 
system for a political union could emerge, as floated 
in 1986 by the European affairs spokesperson of the 
CDU/CSU group in the German Bundestag, Gero 
Pfennig.64
Abbreviations 
 It would possess its own revenue powers, 
could raise European taxes, and would possess sep-
arate European and member state budgets and a ver-
tical European financial transfer system. 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
CDU Christian Democratic Union 
CSU Christian Social Union 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund 
ESF European Social Fund 
ESM European Stability Mechanism 
EU European Union 
GNP Gross national product 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework 
ÖVP Austrian People’s Party 
 
64  Pfennig, “Eine neue Finanzverfassung für die EG” (see 
note 20). 
